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A questionnaire was developed to mey  the attitudes of a sinall population of 
Control Desk Engineers (CDES) at a UX. manufacturing plant.  The general aims 
of the survey were to obtain information to enable an asscsgnent of CDEs responses 
to their alarm  system.  Specific objectives of the survey wen: 
1. To elicit the  CDEs'  definition of the term 'alarm' ; 
2.  To examine the  CDES' alarm  handling activities; 
3. To get information on  problems with the aim  system. 
INTRODUCTION 
There is  a need to develop an accurate defdon  of the term 'alarm', because unless  the subject 
under analysis is clearly pinpointed it cannot be studied properly.  A frequently given deiinition 
of an alarm is "a si@cant  attractor of attention", however a dictionary (Collins, 1986) gives 9 
defbitions of  the word 'alarm'. This demonstrates the inadequacy  of the first definition, 
because whilst an  alarm does attract attention, its 'attractiveness' is only one of its many 
properties or qualities (Stanton &  Booth,  199Oa).  The main problem with defdons  of 
"alarm"  is that they tend to concentrate on one or a limited subset of its qualities.  An alarm may 
be considered from  various pmpcaives (Singleton, 1989), but they need to be integrated into 
one  comprehensive definition if the term is to be understood in its entirety. One Human 
Factors approach is to consider the alarm within a systems model (Stanton & Booth, 1990b). 
This uses a 5 main point definition: Specification,  Activation, Attraction, Acknowledgement 
and Action. In breaking the definition down into five main parts, it is possible to suggest how 
different perspectives might conmbute to a more comprehensive definition (Stanton,  1990a). 
QUESTIONNAIRE ANALYSIS 
Eight self selected respondents hm  a proccss plant within the U.K.  completed an  'Alarm 
Handling Questionnaire' devised to assess  their attitudes toward their alarm system.  Their 
central control room experience ranged hm  seven to thirty eight years.  Content analysis was 
employed for analysisng the questionnaire  data as  many of the items were open ended. Design 
of the questionnaire was undertaken after an intial visit to the control room and a small pilot 
study. 
The questionnaire sought to gain the CDEs'  (Control  Desk Engineer) definition of the darrn 
system(s)  with which they arc familiar. Content analysis of their responses showed that the 
majority of CDEs believe that the alarm system: 
was designed to attract their attention to faults, 
provides waming information, 
is used to initiate fault hnding activities. 
This suggests that the designers' perspective (certainly in terms of the definition) does not 
always concur with the users' perspective (Stanton, 1990a) and may lead to problems in 
operation. 
little empirid evidence has bcen presented in their support,  outside of thc experimuual 
laboratory. This questionnaire aimed  to get some insight into CDE activities by the use  of 
Many theoretical models have been developed to explain control room behaviour. but very 
7/1 critical incident technique: to ask them what they did in response to routine alanns. and what 
they did in nsponse  to critical events.  The following model was developed from previous 
mearch m au unrelated  industry (Stanton, 1990b)  which highlight the difference between 
routine incidents mwhmg alarms and critical incidents  involving alarms.  TypicaUy CDE's 
report that they wiU observe the onset of an alarm, accept it and make a fairly rapid 
analysis of whether it may be ignored, dealt with superficiauy or require further 
investigation.  Then, even if they feel that it may requite further  investigation, they may still 
try to correct and cancel it just to see what happens. If it cannot be cleared, then they wiU  go 
into an investigative mode to seck the cause. Then in the final stage the CDE  will  monitor the 
status of the plant brought about by his corrective actions. The high cognitive level 
"Investigation" is what dkmgwha  cxiticd from routine incidents. The model may be 
considered in terms  of previous models of event handling in conml rooms  which lend some 
theoretical support  from an  information processing viewpoint. As  it is based on CDEs  reported 
activities it has  the benefit of some empirical support also. 
This model was largely supported by the respondents answers to the questionnaire. It is 
proposed that the alarm  system should support  the six stages of handling, not disrupt them. 
However the requirements fiom the alum system may be dif€mnt  in each of the stages.  For 
example: 
attraction is required in the observation stage; 
time to read and achowiedge arc required in the acceptance stage; 
links with related data are required in the analysis stage; 
underlying cause@)  is needed in the investigation stage; 
appropriate corrective action is required in the correction sage; 
and  changes brought about by corrective action needs to be shown in 
CDES were asked how they diagnose faults based on alarm infodon. This is mainly 
based on past experimce. but sometimes also includes the pattern of alarms and  order of 
occurrence. The suggestion that past experience  plays the major part in diagnosis  places a 
hportant emphasis on the training of CDEs  to present a wide range of conditions, some of 
which may only be encountered  very mfrquently. Bainbridge (1984) suggested that past 
experience can play a major part in diagnosis,  but that this could also be a potential source of 
emr,  as it may be misleading. It puts an  emphasis on  encountering a wide range of plant 
conditions if it is to be  a successful diagnosis strategy. 
and what mqht be done to alleviate them.  The responses it reasonable to suppose  that alarms 
are missed, and 4 examples occurred recently. The major reported reasons for alarms being 
missed were related to: inadequate training, not being present in the central control room, 
jamming the audible alarm, system failure and  the dismction of other tasks. 
If alarms  an  being missed, then it follows that they have not been detected. This may 
provide a starting point for consideration of  how to support the detection stage of alm 
handling. If the alarm has  not been detected, the information cannot be passed to the 
subsequent dam handling stages.  However, it is hypothesised by the author that difficulties 
in the design of alarm systems are almost inevitable due to the conflicts that arise in the support 
of each stage of alarm  handling. In terms of Wickens (1984) "multiple resource" and "S-C-R 
theories there is a possibility of  competition over  limited cognitive resources. Multxple 
resources theory suggests that attentional resources concentrated at one stage may subtract from 
the next, but free channels may  enable the use of other input modalities. Whereas, S-C-R 
theory suggests that there  needs to be a compatible relationship between the processing of 
information from one stage to the next.  Further,  Rouse (1983) noted that tlE diagnosis (called 
'investigation' in the model presented) and compensation (called 'correction' in the model 
presented) BT~  in conflict. In response to an incident, a longer wait before intemention may 
lead to a mort accurate diagnosis,  but it may also lead to a further deterioration in plant state. 
the monitoring stage. 
The final aim of the questionnaire  was to eiicit from CDEs  what problems they encountered, CDES were asked what aspects of the information  presented to them in the CCR hindered 
the diagnosis of the cause of  the  alarm.  The responses suggest that  there is to little information 
to diagnose from,  and what information is made available is difficult to interpret. Goodstein 
(1985) proposes that these type of problems are typical of using essentially 'raw' plant data. 
This demonspates that the alarm  system does not appear to be supporting the investigative 
processes of the CDE  during the diagnosis stage of dam handling. 
Half of the CDEs who responded thought that their alarm system could be improved. The 
suggestions were: admg the fault finding process, keeping a permanent mod  of alarms as a 
look-back' facility and the improved use  of coding (i.e. tones) to speed up the identification 
and classification  process. 
CONCLUSIONS 
suggest  that a new approach to alarm systems is  required. Then  is certainly a need to develop 
a more accurate definition  of an dam,  because unless we know what it is we are studying, we 
cannot conduct uscf'ul research. The definition may allow a controlled investigation of specific 
attributes or qualities of  an  alarm system. "%is should be incorporated with an overall 
philosophy of deciding  the  purpose of an alann.  One approach  rmght be to reduce the number 
of alarms to the important ones. The problem remains  that in different contexts what is 
'imponant' might change.  So this simplistic approach is of very limited use. Another 
approach might be  to incorporate aiarms  into better *lay  mahods, to -lay  the  information 
in a manner that  is compatible both with the task and human thought processes. This does not 
necessarily mcan a reduction in the amount of information available. such  as  proposed  in the 
fm  approach, but different means of looking at the information to support the task. 
Representation  of dm  information should ideally reflect the nature of the operators' task, and 
what they arc required to do with the presented information. This highlights  the need for a 
flexible mvironmem for manipulating the  raw data, to present the infonnarion in a compatible 
manner.  otherwise  the operator  has  to perfonn this manipulation internally, which may add 
substantially to the task. 
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